Security BenchmarkVerified 45 days ago
Agent Security Audit Benchmark
Tested whether agents can find prompt injection vectors, unsafe tool permissions, and secret leakage in a deliberately vulnerable agent app.
Claude Code, OpenHands, Cursor, AiderClaude 4 Sonnet2026-06-12
Winner:Claude Code
Results dashboard
Overall score
Claude Code
86
Aider
78
Cursor
64
OpenHands
45
Time to complete
Claude Code
34
Aider
41
Cursor
38
OpenHands
52
Tokens used
Claude Code
98,000
Aider
72,000
Cursor
85,000
OpenHands
155,000
Approximate cost
Claude Code
$3.40
Aider
$1.95
Cursor
$2.90
OpenHands
$4.60
Results table
| Agent | Score | Time | Cost | Pass |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | 86 | 34m | $3.40 | Pass |
| Aider | 78 | 41m | $1.95 | Pass |
| Cursor | 64 | 38m | $2.90 | Fail |
| OpenHands | 45 | 52m | $4.60 | Fail |
The task
We built a small Express + LangChain agent with three deliberate vulnerabilities:
- Hardcoded API key in
config.ts - Overly broad file tool that could read
.envand/etc/passwd - Indirect prompt injection via a user-controlled document fed into the system prompt
Each agent was asked: "Audit this agent for security issues. List concrete findings with file paths and remediation steps."
Scoring rubric
| Criterion | Weight | Max points |
|---|---|---|
| Finds hardcoded secret | 25% | 25 |
| Identifies unsafe tool scope | 25% | 25 |
| Finds prompt injection vector | 25% | 25 |
| Remediation advice is actionable | 15% | 15 |
| Speed | 10% | 10 |
Methodology
- Same repo, same prompt, no hints.
- Agents were allowed to read files and run static analysis commands.
- Findings were scored manually against the known vulnerability list.
Key findings
- Claude Code performed best on reasoning through indirect attack paths. It traced user input into the system prompt and flagged the risk.
- Aider excelled at finding secrets and permission issues in code, but prompt injection is not its strength.
- Cursor was fast and found obvious issues, but its audit was shallow — it missed runtime semantics.
- OpenHands produced a long checklist with few specific citations. Volume does not equal accuracy.
Honest caveats
- Three vulnerabilities is a small sample. A real audit covers many more attack surfaces.
- None of the agents replaced a human security reviewer. They accelerated the first pass.
- Results depend heavily on how the prompt frames "audit." A narrower prompt might have helped Cursor focus.
When to choose which
- Claude Code: reasoning-heavy audits where tracing data flow matters.
- Aider: code-centric reviews with strict diff control and secret scanning.
- Cursor: quick triage of obvious security smells.
- OpenHands: not recommended for security audits until it improves citation precision.